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Chapter 7 
The Ascent from Modernity: 
Solzhenitsyn on "Repentance and 
Self-Limitation in the Life of Nations" 
Daniel J. Mahoney 
Repentance, not Utopia, is the greatest revolutionary force in the moral world. 
-Max Scheler 
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn clearly believes that Christianity ought to assume a 
significant place in the public life of contemporary societies. In his 1973 Letter to 
the Soviet Leaders, he pleaded with the Soviet leadership to abandon a "decrepit 
and hopelessly antiquated" ideology that, he argued, was the basis of the most 
mendacious tyranny in human history, and that had proved to be neither scientific 
in its empirical claims nor capable of addressing the real dilemmas of modern 
society .1 He called for nothing less than competition "between all ideological and 
moral currents, and in particular between all religions,"2 confident that Marxist-
Leninism would collapse of the weight of its own falsehood ifit were deprived of 
its ideological monopoly. On that occasion, he stated that he wished for no special 
privileges for Christianity despite his belief that it was "the only living spiritual 
force capable of undertaking the spiritual healing ofRussia."3 Despite the modest 
character of Solzhenitsyn's hopes for a Christian role in the regeneration of Russia, 
the legend grew about his supposedly theocratic propensities. He was even accused 
of wanting "new Gulags, new Ayatollahs" by certain emigre writers such as Eftim 
Etkind, in a move that Solzhenitsyn angrily labeled "the Persian trick.'"' 
Few of Solzhenitsyn's critics have bothered to subject his writings to serious 
analysis. They did not take the time to carefully examine the call for a "national 
rebirth" that Solzhenitsyn and six other writers had put forward in the 1974 
collection From Under the Rubble.5 How could Russia escape from under the 
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"dank and dark depths"6 of communist totalitarianism without descending into 
social chaos, ethnic conflict, or new forms of tyranny? these writers asked. How 
could she recover her national soul as well as her liberties after decades of 
ideocratic rule? Solzhenitsyn and his collaborators proposed nothing less than a 
peaceful moral revolution made possible "by traveling [the] path of repentance, 
self-limitation and inner development."7 These themes would resonate in all of 
Solzhenitsyn's subsequent political essays and programmatic statements over the 
next twenty-five years. Of Solzhenitsyn's three contributions to From Under the 
Rubble, the essay "Repentance and Self-Limitation in the Life of Nations" is the 
most synoptic in character and the one that best captures his hopes for Russia's 
future. 8 It is also one of his most philosophical statements, combining a critique of 
philosophical and political modernity, including the social sciences, with an ·~ 
analysis of the place ofrepentance and self-limitation in natural human experience 
and in the Christian religion. In 1998, Solzhenitsyn told his biographer, Joseph 
Pearce, that he still considers it to be "one ofhis most important articles, expressing 
one of his key thoughts."9 This chapter consists of a detailed exegesis of and 
commentary on Solzhenitsyn's essay. Its aim is nothing less than a philosophical 
exploration of Solzhenitsyn's recommendation of the path of repentance, self-
limitation, and inner development for a Russia emerging from underthe rubble and, 
more generally, a modern world in the midst of a profound intellectual and spiritual 
crisis. 
The Transference of Value Judgments 
Part 1 of "Repentance and Self-Limitation in the Life of Nations" begins with a 
quotation from book 19 of St. Augustine's City of God: "What is the state without 
justice? A band ofrobbers." Solzhenitsyn is less interested in analyzing the truth 
of a judgment with which he concurs ("Even now, fifteen centuries later, many 
people will, I think, readily recognize the force and accuracy of this judgment") 
than in examining the human propensity to apply "ethical judgments about a small 
group of people" to "larger social phenomena and associations of people, up to and 
including the nation and the state as a whole." Solzhenitsyn upholds the naturalness 
and necessity of the "transference" of ethical judgments from the individual to the 
social and political sphere-and, in the process, criticizes the social sciences for 
their methodological ascetism, their strict prohibition against "extensions of 
meaning" to larger social phenomena (105.). 
Solzhenitsyn implicitly criticizes the "fact-value" distinction at the heart of the 
modern social scientific enterprise. The "fact-value" distinction is itself a 
radicalization of Immanuel Kant's argument in his Critique of Judgment for the 
"'All references to "Repentance and Self-Limitation in the Life of Nations" will henceforth 
be cited parenthetically in the text. (See bibliographical infonnation in note 8.) 
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absolute independence of the cognitive, ethical, and esthetic spheres. Solzhenitsyn 
i affirms the human need to evaluate political life by ethical criteria, however 
''provincial" ( 1 OS) or old-fashioned such an endeavor may appear to the positivist 
cast of mind. Delba Winthrop has rightly noted that Solzhenitsyn's confrontation 
with the ideological lie somehow led him to an ancillary confrontation with the 
dogmatism at the heart of the social scientific enterprise. 10 In "Repentance and Self-
Limitation in the Life of Nations" Solzhenitsyn confronts the dogma, sacrosanct 
in social scientific circles, that reason as such can tell us nothing about how human 
beings ought to live, that true science is incompatible with value judgments. 
Solzhenitsyn attacks the "arrogant insensitivity of the modem trend in the social 
sciences" for ignoring the naturalness and necessity of transferring "age-old human 
impulses and feelings" from the realm of personal and interpersonal relations to 
larger social phenomena ( l 06). Solzhenitsyn seems to ignore or abstract from the 
fact that the separation of fact and value as articulated by Max Weber and his 
epigoni forbids the application of value judgments to individual phenomena as well 
as to larger social aggregates 11-at least value judgments that claim any reasonable 
as opposed to idiosyncratic or arbitrary foundation. But Solzhenitsyn would not be 
deterred by this objection. He takes for granted that human beings are evaluative 
beings precisely because they are moral agents responsible for conducting their 
individual and collective lives honorably. "The transference of values"-the 
application of the "laws and demands which constitute the aim and meaning of 
individual human lives" to human society at large-is "entirely natural to the 
religious cast of mind." But, Solzhenitsyn tellingly adds, "even without a religious 
foundation, this sort of transference is readily and naturally made." For 
Solzhenitsyn, religion provides powerful reinforcement for what is natural to 
human beings. Solzhenitsyn's defense of repentance and self-limitation does not 
depend on prior religious commitments-although these natural goods clearly point 
beyond themselves and are compatible with the truth of faith. 
The application of ethical criteria to the realms of personal and interpersonal life 
is integral to what it means to be human. For example, the transference of moral 
judgment to "the biggest social events or human organizations, including whole 
states" is entirely natural in Solzhenitsyn's view. Human beings instinctively apply 
the full range of"spiritual values," of human virtues and vices, to the social and 
political spheres, freely speaking of the "noble, base, courageous, cowardly, 
hypocritical, false, cruel, magnanimous, just, unjust" traits of men and 
communities. Solzhenitsyn wryly notes that "even the most extreme economic 
materialists" write this way "since they remain after all human beings." To be a 
human being is to be a person who evaluates the qualities intrinsic to human 
actions and institutions. The moral and evaluative character of individuals and 
societies is a given of our nature and it cannot be wished away in the name of 
scrupulous adherence to scientific or ideological criteria. Without a clear-cut 
adherence to and thoughtful analysis of the moral dimensions of social life, society 
risks being "brutalized by the triumph of evil instincts, no matter where the pointer 
of the great economic laws may tum" (106). To resist the moral examination of 
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social phenomena in the name of science or adherence to moral or cultural 
relativism is to "evade" a primordial and fundamental human responsibility. In 
parts 2-5 of the essay under examination, Solzhenitsyn turns to a thoroughgoing 
examination of social life with reference to two essential categories of individual 
ethics: repentance and self-limitation. These are the touchstones of Solzhenitsyn's 
reflection and the place where his philosophical, spiritual, and political concerns 
most clearly and fruitfully converge. 
The Gift of Repentance 
Solzhenitsyn calls repentance a "gift" that "perhaps more than anything else 
distinguishes man from the animal world" (107). He leaves open the question of 
whether this gift is given by nature or by God. Repentance is coextensive with the 
human condition but it does not come easily to modern man, who has "grown 
ashamed of this feeling" ( 107). Solzhenitsyn highlights a central feature of 
modernity: it sets out to liberate or emancipate man from conventional restraints, 
but, in profound ways, it estranges him from his nature. "The habit of repentance" 
is increasingly "lost to our callous and chaotic age" ( 107). In light of modem man's 
resistance to any settled notion of limits, his refusal to bow down before a divine 
or natural order that is responsible for the "givenness" ( 110) of his nature, 
Solzhenitsyn asks if his article is not in fact "premature or altogether pointless" 
(107). But he resists this conclusion because he is confident that modernity's 
rejection oflimits is untenable and unsustainable; a "hollow place in modem man" 
makes him "ready to receive" (107) repentance and self-limitation in both the 
personal and social spheres of life. 
Solzhenitsyn thus affirms the primacy of the Good-he has confidence in the 
permanence of the Permanent Things-in the ultimate solidity of a natural order. 
The undeniable progress of science and technology in the modem world cannot 
change the fact that man's freedom and dignity reside more in his capacity for inner 
development than in his ability to transform the external world. Progress is an 
undeniable necessity capable of bringing great benefits to the human race. But it 
is also a chimera if it claims to provide the key to understanding the mystery that 
is man. And infinite progress risks contributing to environmental catas-
trophe-even to "the end of the worl<I' ( 107) foretold by the prophets of old. 
It is not appropriate on this occasion to subject Solzhenitsyn's "green" 
presuppositions to detailed scrutiny. For now, we must be content with some 
necessarily cursory remarks. Suffice it to say that Solzhenitsyn accepts the most 
pessimistic, "Malthusian" analyses of the global ecological crisis, drawing in 
particular on the hyperbolic claims of the Club of Rome from the late 1960s and 
early 1970s about imminent global catastrophe as a result of uncontrolled economic 
development, galloping population growth, and continued polluting of the planet 
(137, 143). For Solzhenitsyn, self-limitation has thus become a practical necessity ' 
if mankind is not to "perish as a result of the total exhaustion, barrenness and 
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pollution of the planet" (108). 
Solzhenitsyn's ecological vision is rooted in deep reservations about the human 
adequacy of unfettered external development or unlimited progress, development 
that turns human beings away from the cultivation of their souls, genuine concerns 
about the effects of industrial civilization on the integrity of nonhuman nature, as 
well as in a profound revulsion against totalitarian communism's Promethean 
contempt for any limits to the conquest of nature. His green proclivities are an 
inherent element ofhis philosophical and political critique of modernity and should 
not be dismissed as romantic or reactionary longings. Solzhenitsyn, a scientist by 
training, does not oppose the legitimacy of modern progress or the importance of 
technological development (he even recognizes that technology provides a crucial 
way out of the approaching abyss of ecological catastrophe). His writings are also 
free of the pantheistic worship of "Gaia" or mother earth that is an increasingly 
important part of the "theology" ofradical or deep ecology. But Solzhenitsyn could 
be faulted for too readily accepting suspect empirical claims of radical 
environmentalists, for underestimating the crucial role that the market can play in 
encouraging ecological responsibility, and for adopting a quasi-apocalyptic rhetoric 
that understates the very real progress that has been made, especially in the liberal 
democratic nations of the West, in addressing pollution and other environmental 
dangers. 12 And as Nicholas Eberstadt has recently highlighted, the pressing 
problem facing the "developed" world in the next half century is likely to be 
depopulation, with its attendant consequences for sustaining a welfare state, civic 
peace, an ever graying population, and the political rank or influence of once 
dominant Western nations. 13 Solzhenitsyn himself has expressed deep concerns 
about depopulation in the former U.S.S.R. 14-although the causes of that 
demographic disaster are decidedly different from the changing population patterns 
of the prosperous West. 
Solzhenitsyn surely wishes to stress the practical urgency of a turn to repentance 
and self-limitation for modern peoples who are all too prone to dismiss advice they 
see as moralistic or hortatory in character. But the deepest argument for repentance 
is, according to Solzhenitsyn, a "fact, which has been made plain, especially by art, 
a thousand times before" (109). This fact is perhaps the central moral message of 
Solzhenitsyn's The Gulag Archipelago-and is at the heart ofhis rejection of every 
form of religious or ideological manicheanism. Human beings have a propensity 
to localize evil in others and resist the appeal of religion to "censure, denounce and 
hate" ( 108) the evil in themselves. Modern man is increasingly estranged from the 
dramatic character of the human condition and the "mixed" character of the human 
soul. Solzhenitsyn reiterates a central "fact" obscured by sophisticated currents of 
contemporary philosophy and social science: Good and evil are not some arbitrary 
constructions of language or culture but vital qualities of soul that pulsate through 
every human being. The ideological construction of a surreal world "beyond good 
and evil" dehumanizes men and turns them away from the arduous but eminently 
human task of inner spiritual development and self-limitation. In words almost 
identical to those used in The Gulag Archipelago15 Solzhenitsyn writes: 
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But obvious though it may be, we are even now, with the twentieth 
century on its way out, reluctant to recognize that the universal dividing 
line between good and evil runs not between countries, not between 
nations, not between parties, not between classes, not even between 
good and bad men: the dividing line cuts across nations and parties, 
shifting, constantly yielding now to the pressure of light, now to the 
pressure of darkness. It divides the heart of every man, and there too it 
is not a ditch dug once and for all, but fluctuates with the passage of 
time and according to a man's behavior. (108) 
Repentance is a gift available to human beings who have come to know 
themselves. It provides an opportunity for civic concord and spiritual growth, 
which, alas, human beings are all too prone to resist. Human beings wish to blame 
other parties, nations, and races for the imperfection of the world or even for their 
own imperfections and faults. This process of attacking the other is easier than 
searching "for our own errors and sins" ( l 08). In a particularly powerful passage 
in part 3 of the essay, Solzhenitsyn suggests that communist ideology intensified 
the intractable human resistance to the gift of repentance, locating evil and 
evildoing in distinct social and ontological categories. Such an obfuscation of the 
mixed character of all individuals and social bodies is at the heart of the communist 
lie and is an essential reason for its intrinsically coercive character. Solzhenitsyn 
writes: 
For half a century now we have acted on the conviction that the guilty 
ones were the tsarist establishment, the bourgeois patriots, social 
democrats, White Guards, priests, emigres, subversives, Kulaks ... 
anyone and everyone except you and me! Obviously it was they, not 
we, who had to reform. But they dug their heels in and refused to. So 
how could they be made to reform, except by bayonets, revolvers, 
barbed wire, starvation? (l 17) 
Solzhenitsyn, then, does not consider his appeal to repentance to be in any way 
quixotic or utopian. Repentance provides "the first firm ground underfoot, the only 
one from which we can go forward not to fresh hatreds but to concord" ( 108). It 
provides ''the only starting point for spiritual growth" (108) for individuals and 
social bodies alike. Yet Solzhenitsyn is cognizant of the many objections that will 
be raised to the transference of repentance to the social and political realm. A critic 
of the partisan character of modem representative government, Solzhenitsyn does 
not expect political parties ("utterly inhuman formations") to repent for their 
misjudgments or misdeeds. The same cannot be said of politicians, who do not 
necessarily "lose their human qualities" and thus are open, in principle, to the call 
ofrepentance (109). 
Nations, in contrast to partisan movements, are "vital formations, susceptible to 
all moral feelings, including, however painful a step it may be-repentance" ( 109). 
Solzhenitsyn cites the authority of Dostoyevsky, who in his Diary of a Writer 
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affirms the indebtedness of every nation to a prior ethical idea. Political foundings 
are simultaneously theological and ethical as well as political events (Dostoyevsky 
gives the example of Moses and the Hebrew polity and the various Muslim nations 
"founded after the appearance of the Koran"). Neither Dostoyevsky nor 
Solzhenitsyn is willing to draw the Machiavellian conclusion, reiterated by 
Rousseau, that sees in such foundings the manipulation of a godlike legislator who 
provides the subsequent horizon of a people's corporate existence. Solzhenitsyn 
draws on Dostoyevsky to stress the inescapably spiritual dimension of national life 
and hence the "right" of a people to repent, to cultivate and preserve its national 
soul. 
Solzhenitsyn ends part 2 of"Repentance and Self-Limitation" by raising three 
doubts that naturally arise in considering the application of repentance to the nation 
as a whole. The first concerns the legitimacy of"talking about the qualities or traits 
of a whole nation." Doesn't the expectation of repentance for an entire people 
presuppose that "the sin, the vice, the defect is that of the whole nation" (I 09)? 
Second, doesn't the call for national repentance presuppose collective 
responsibility for wrongdoing? But under authoritarian or totalitarian governments, 
the mass of people "can neither obstruct nor contribute to the decisions of its 
leaders." Solzhenitsyn tellingly asks, "What should it repent of?" (109). 
Finally, Solzhenitsyn asks how a nation as a whole can express its repentance. 
Isn't repentance the work of singular individuals who take responsibility where 
most refuse to act? How then can a people as a whole repent? 
In the first half of part 3, Solzhenitsyn systemically responds to these 
fundamental obstacles to the idea of national repentance. 
A "Community of Guilt" and Common Repentance 
In his "Nobel Lecture on Literature," Solzhenitsyn affirmed the indispensable place 
of the nation in "God's design." The disappearance of national forms ''would 
impoverish us not less than if all men should become alike, with one personality 
and one face."16 And elsewhere in From Under the Rubble, in the opening essay 
"As Breathing and Consciousness Return," he dissects Andrei Sakharov's "Saint-
Simonian" vision (in Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom) of world 
government and scientific management of the international economy, guided by 
spiritually sensitive experts and administrators. 17 Solzhenitsyn is among those who 
"set the highest value on the existence of the nation, who see in it not the 
ephemeral fruit of social formations but a complex, vivid, unrepeatable organism 
not invented by man" (110). He goes so far as to speak of ''the profoundest 
similarity between the individual and the nation," a similarity that "lies in the 
mystical nature of their 'givenness'" (110). What are we to make of these 
remarkable "mystical" or metapolitical claims made on behalf of the nation? 
Perhaps it is best to begin by analyzing Solzhenitsyn's notion of the givenness 
ofindividual and national life. This claim is not in and ofitselfmystical and is open 
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to rational and philosophical examination. In asserting the givenness of individual 
and collective life, Solzhenitsyn reiterates his long-standing criticism of 
"anthropocentric humanism," of modernity's confidence in what Aurel Kolnai has 
called the "self-sovereignty" of man. In Solzhenitsyn's view man "participates" in 
an order that he neither creates nor is able to negate. 18 Solzhenitsyn joins a long and 
venerable tradition that sees man above all as "a debtor" (Bertrand de Jouvenel)19 
who owes everything to an order of things finally beyond human control and 
manipulation. Modem political philosophy is replete with an unfounded confidence 
in the capacity of human beings to conquer fortune (Machiavelli, Prince, ch. 25) 
and sees man as the matter and maker (Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 29) of an immense 
project of social and individual self-creation. Without denying the importance of 
the political regime (most of Solzhenitsyn's political polemics of the 1970s and 
1980s centered on a desperate effort to remind an intellectually senescent Western 
world that Russia was not the same thing as the ideocratic "U.S.S.R."20), 
Solzhenitsyn sees in the nation, the eternal nation, the incubus of civilization and 
the social embodiment of the moral inheritance of man. Solzhenitsyn believes that 
nations are spiritual entities as much as political ones, and "can soar to heights and 
plunge to the depths, run[ning] the whole gamut from saintliness to utter 
wickedness (although only individuals ever reach the extremes)" (110). 
Solzhenitsyn's ethical/spiritual conception of the nation is alien to the civic 
republican, creedal, and contractual understandings of national identity that are 
indebted to the American and French revolutionary experiences.21 But it is also 
distinct from ethnic and even merely cultural explanations of national identity. It 
has something in common with Charles Peguy's notion that politics in the narrow 
or specific sense of the term must always be undergirded by a mystique, a spiritual 
vivacity that gives it energy and purpose, or to Charles de Gaulle's notion that 
beyond passing regimes are the fatum of nations and peoples who endure despite 
the best efforts of revolutionaries or ideologues. 22 And Pierre Manent has exposed 
the dependence of even the democratic polity, with its grand ambition for collective 
self-government, on national forms that give territorial and historical expression to 
what is otherwise an inhuman abstraction. Democratic peoples, too, are indebted 
to inheritances, including the nation itself, that precede their constitutional 
foundings or their belief in the principle of individual and collective consent.23 
Some things cannot be consented to-they need to be accepted in a spirit of 
humility, even piety. Patriotism is a constant reminder of the sacral dimension of 
any civic community, however secular in inspiration. Even today, many ordinary 
citizens of the Western democracies remain old-fashioned patriots. They 
instinctively reject the abstract "constitutional patriotism" put forward by 
intellectuals such as Jilrgen Habermas, who reduce national loyalty to the 
acceptance of procedural political forms. 
Relying on "intuitive perceptions" rather than "positivist knowledge" (110), 
Solzhenitsyn asserts that the "shifting boundary between good and evil" of which 
he previously spoke "oscillates continuously in the consciousness of a nation" 
(110). Nations, like individuals, can "change beyond recognition in the course of 
The Ascent from Modernity 121 
their lives" ( 110). "Because of the mutability of all existence, a nation can no more 
live without sin than an individual" (110). In a manner reminiscent of the 
arguments of the neo-Augustinian theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, Solzhenitsyn 
insists that "every nation" is under judgment, that whatever the tragedies of a 
particular country's national experience, it "has certainly at one time or another 
contributed its share of inhumanity, injustice and arrogance" (111 ). Solzhenitsyn 
criticizes all forms of nationalism that abstract from the properly penitential aspects 
of authentic patriotism. But ifit is necessary to avoid manicheanjudgments or one-
sided national antipathies, it is also necessary to reject the cool, scientific 
asceticism that tries to transcend the evaluation ofnational experience. Whether we 
like it or not, we cannot understand social phenomena without appreciating the 
virtues and vices that are inherent to all human action. Solzhenitsyn's defense of 
the transference of value judgments to social and political phenomena is 
inseparable from his recognition of the givenness of human life. Nations, like 
individuals, have an obligation to acquit themselves responsibly, recognizing an 
ethical order that transcends individual or collective willfulness. And it is natural 
for human beings to judge nations "as a whole," as long as that judgment is 
balanced by a genuine recognition of the intrinsic imperfection of all things human. 
Solzhenitsyn responds to the second objection, that not every individual or 
citizen is responsible for the crimes of their governments, by arguing that our 
inheritance includes the crimes of our forbears-"the sins of the fathers" (113). 
Each generation does not begin anew. The great contract of the living, dead, and 
yet to be born-what Chesterton famously called the "democracy of the 
dead"-unites a nation "in a community of guilt" that requires "common 
repentance" (113). Nations are "integrated organisms" (113) and cannot avoid 
responsibility by passing things off as the product of other men, or times, or 
regimes. Solzhenitsyn chooses his cases ecumenically-giving examples of 
wrongdoing in liberal, authoritarian, and totalitarian regimes and from the 
developed and developing world. 
The peoples of western Europe (e.g., the British, French, and Dutch), for 
example, did little to obstruct the adoption of colonial policies by their respective 
governments even though ''their system of government allowed for considerable 
obstruction to be placed in the way of colonialism by society" ( 111 ). They share 
guilt for the wrongdoings associated with colonialism. About this particular wrong, 
there has certainly been a lot of posturing and some genuine regrets, although 
repentance does not seem to describe the West's doubts in this regard. 
The next example is near and dear to Solzhenitsyn's heart-and recurs in many 
of his works from the first volume of The Gulag Archipelago to the Address to the 
International Academy of Philosophy in Liechtenstein on September 14, 1993. 24 
Solzhenitsyn highlights the British and American complicity in the forcible 
repatriation of hundreds of thousands of civilian refugees to the U.S.S.R. 
immediately after World War II in the infamous "Operation Keelhaul." The action 
of Allied governments contributed to the deaths and imprisonments of tens of 
thousands of people. Writing in 197 4, Solzhenitsyn indignantly protests that no one 
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has raised a finger to bring those responsible to punishment or even to hold them 
accountable in the court of public opinion. Worst of all, "the voice of repentance 
has still not been heard" (112). Yet in the years since the publication of From 
Under the Rubble, and in no small part due to the efforts of Solzhenitsyn himself, 
this "last secret"25 (as Solzhenitsyn has called it) of World War II has been the 
subject of excellent books by Julius Epstein and Nicholas Bethell, among others.26 
If there has not been collective repentance on the part of Britain and the United 
States, these books represent an effort to come to terms with the shame of events 
still too little known by the ordinary public in the W estem democracies. 
Solzhenitsyn's last two examples come from tyrannical regimes-from the 
bloody tyranny ofldi Amin Dada in Uganda and from Enver Hoxha's fanatically 
totalitarian regime in postwar Albania. Ugandans may not have been directly 
responsible for the bloody incidents that characterized Amin's rule. Nonetheless, 
they gave tacit backing to his expulsion of the productive and law-abiding Asian 
minority in 1971. "There is no doubt that [Amin] had the self-interested approval 
of a population which battens on the spoils of the deported." As Ugandans 
embarked on the path of nationhood, "repentance is the very last feeling they 
[were] about to experience" (112). It is much harder to hold ordinary Albanians 
responsible for the crimes of Hoxha's fanatical Marxist regime (a regime that 
executed parents for the "crime" of baptizing their children). But Solzhenitsyn 
adds, "the enthusiastic layer of the population which keeps (Hoxha) in orbit must 
surely have been recruited from ordinary Albanian families" (113). Solzhenitsyn 
has insisted that post-communist societies, such as Albania or the former republics 
of the U.S.S.R., must punish those who were principally responsible for the crimes 
of the totalitarian regime. Otherwise, the new generation is taught that evil goes 
unpunished in this world, that, in the end, "might makes right." But more 
fundamental than judicial punishment is the need for collective responsibility and 
repentance for the crimes of the past. It is not merely a question of us-the 
victims-and them-the guilty, although that distinction is pertinent to the reality 
of the totalitarian or ideocratic state. But no one is wholly without guilt. In a 
totalitarian society, everyone, to some extent or another, has "taken part in the lie" 
even if only by refusing to display civic courage or by unintentionally reinforcing 
the ideological claims of the regime.27 Even in the totalitarian state, then, the 
"community of guilt" is real. Only public and collective repentance can begin to 
purge the sins of the past and allow society to pursue a healthy path of 
development. 
Solzhenitsyn next turns to an examination of the third objection-Is it possible 
for a nation as a whole to express its repentance? He readily admits that "individual 
expressions of this common repentance are dubiously representative for we cannot 
know when those who make them speak with authority" ( 113 ). An added difficulty 
is that those who take it upon themselves to "pronounce words of repentance on 
behalf of society as a whole" must "inevitably distribute the blame, indicating the 
various degrees of culpability of various groups-and that necessarily changes the 
spirit and tone of repentance" (113). It is only in retrospect that one can "unerringly 
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judge to what degree one man has expressed a genuine change of heart in his 
nation" ( 114 ). The reader cannot but help be reminded of Solzhenitsyn himself, 
who since his return to Russia in May of 1994-and long before, as the essay 
testifies-has tirelessly pleaded for common national repentance for the crimes of 
the Soviet period. For the most part, his calls have gone unheeded-ignored by a 
political class and society that both have ample reasons for forgetting their 
complicity in the perpetuation of communist rule. Only time will tell if 
Solzhenitsyn's calls for repentance are the first step toward public healing and a 
harbinger of a fuller societal confrontation with the past or merely an eccentric 
protest against a complacent society that refuses to come to terms with the 
totalitarian past. 
But, Solzhenitsyn insists, repentance can become "the normal mood of all 
thinking society" (114). A good example is the nineteenth-century Russian 
intelligentsia, which was filled with genuine "repentance" for the injustices that 
plagued tsarist society. For the first time Solzhenitsyn even raises the possibility 
that the gift of repentance can be misused-and that penitents can cease ''to 
acknowledge any good in themselves or any sin in the common people" (114}-a 
clear reference to the nihilistic hatred of the existing order and the populist 
adulation of the people that characterized the attitude of educated nineteenth-
century Russian "society." This moralistic or one-sided repentance had 
"incalculable-and even counterproductive-consequences" ( 114}-consequences 
that are a principal theme of Solzhenitsyn's Red Wheel. Solzhenitsyn believes that 
the nihilistic contempt for Russia and Russian national consciousness is a 
pernicious inheritance of prerevolutionary Russian political culture-one that 
continues to dominate major currents of Russian liberal thought, as our analysis of 
part 4 of"Repentance and Self-Limitation" will make clear. 
The next example of collective repentance that Solzhenitsyn discusses is much 
more promising. He turns to a discussion of the "powerful movement" of 
repentance in Germany for the crimes of the Hitler period. (He adds that this was 
true only of West Germany-in the so-called German Democratic Republic [GDR] 
communist ideology stood "like an impregnable concrete wall in the way of 
repentance" [114].) West Germany's repentance entailed "real actions," even 
"large concessions" and reached its apex in Chancellor Willy Brandt's "Canossa-
Reise" to Warsaw, Auschwitz, and Israel. It also found "further expression" in the 
policy of Ost-Politik-the policy of detente with the communist regimes in the east 
(a policy that was far from prudent given the ideological nature of communist 
regimes). Solzhenitsyn's aim, of course, is not to judge the political wisdom ofOst-
Politik, about which he has real doubts, but rather to show that "ethical impulses" 
can give rise to efficacious political action and can begin to transform the moral 
character of a people. But the two examples discussed show that repentance needs 
to be linked with balanced judgment if it is not to degenerate into a mere display 
of good feelings or a moralistic disdain for the complexity of social and political 
arrangements. Solzhenitsyn does not disregard the importance of prudence to 
political life-or simply collapse political and ethical judgment. But it is fair to say 
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that in "Repentance and Self-Limitation" he is not always sufficiently careful in 
distinguishing the two. In his 1993 Lichtenstein address he freely admits that 
"moral criteria applicable to the behavior of individual, families and small groups 
cannot be transferred on a one-to-one basis to the behaviorof states and politicians; 
there is no exact equivalence, as the scale, the momentum and tasks of 
governmental structures introduce a certain deformation" (emphasis mine). 28 
But Solzhenitsyn's principal aim is to show that repentance is a living possibility 
of social life, and that "the penitential impulse" is a natural one conducive to the 
healing and spiritual growth of the Russian people. Russians used to freely affirm 
the truth that, in the words of a proverb, "God is not in might but in right" (l 15). 
This natural ("or partly natural") truth was "powerfully reinforced" by the widely 
shared Orthodox faith of the Russian people ( 115). The practical effect of decades 
of communist rule was to undermine the confidence of human beings in the 
primacy of the Good, a confidence upheld by natural reason and religious faith. 
Marxism, with its utter disregard for a universal or categorical morality that 
transcends the exigencies of "the class struggle," in practice creates a nihilistic 
order in which the mass of people comes to believe that '"might is right' and act 
accordingly" ( 115). Marxism radicalizes the emphasis on individual and collective 
willfulness inherent in modernity, and paradoxically helps create a world where 
Nietzschean "will to power" is triumphant. 
The Russian Case 
Solzhenitsyn does not romanticize prerevolutionary Russia and has no illusions 
about its despotic or unjust features. But he does remind his readers that pre-Petrine 
Russia, in particular, experienced "religious penitence on a mass scale" ( 115) and 
that repentance was considered "among the most prominent Russian national 
characteristics" ( 115). Solzhenitsyn suggests that imperial Russia, even at its most 
despotic, never lost the sense that human beings and institutions are under the 
judgment of God: "Ivan the Terrible's terror never became as all-embracing or 
systematic as Stalin's, largely because the tsar repented and came to his senses" 
(ll5). 
Solzhenitsyn, however, criticizes both the Petersburg (or Petrine and Post-
Petrine) and Muscovite (or Bolshevik) periods of Russian history for estranging 
Russians from their natural and Orthodox proclivity to repentance. The Petersburg 
period saw the radical political subordination of the Church, the continuation and 
consolidation of the monstrous persecution of the Old Believers (who resisted the 
liturgical reforms introduced by Patriarch Nikon in the seventeenth century), and 
an emphasis on external grandeur and "imperial conceit" that "drew the Russian 
spirit even farther from repentance" ( 116). This period also saw the preservation 
and perpetuation of serfdom long after it had become "unthinkable." The blindness 
of the regime contributed to the one-sided and ideologically corrupt "repentance" 
on the part of society of which we have already spoken. This new moralism, 
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disguised as repentance, "came too late to appease angry minds, but engulfed us in 
the clouds of a new savagery, brought a pitiless rain of vengeful blows on our 
heads, an unprecedented terror, and the return, after seventy years, of serfdom in 
a still worse form" (116). Despite his adamant refusal to confuse communist 
totalitarianism with traditional autocracy, Solzhenitsyn has no illusions about the 
partial responsibility of the old regime for the revolution. He knows that Russia's 
estrangement from her best traditions had begun centuries before the onslaught of 
revolutionary nihilism or Bolshevism. 
Under communism, Russians "have not merely lost the gift of repentance ... but 
have ridiculed it." They succumbed to the worst kind ofideological manicheanism, 
one that led to "evil on a massive scale and mainly in our own country." 
Solzhenitsyn does not deny the imperial oppression that accompanied communism 
but he rightly insists that Russians, Ukrainians, and Byelorussians bore the 
principle brunt of communist criminality. And every Russian bears some 
responsibility for communism since those of "the present older and middle 
generations have spent our whole lives floundering and wallowing in the stinking 
swamp ofa society based on force and fraud." Very few have managed to escape 
any defilement. Almost everyone learned to live by the lie, to accommodate 
themselves in one way or another to the ideocratic regime. Solzhenitsyn writes in 
a particularly incisive passage: 
This realm of darkness, of falsehood, or brute force, of justice denied 
and distrust of the good, this slimy swamp was formed by us, and no 
one else. We grew used to the idea that we must submit and lie in order 
to survive-and we brought up our children to do so. Each of us, ifhe 
honestly reviews the life he has led, without special pleading or 
concealment, will recall more than one occasion in which he pretended 
not to hear a cry for help, averted his indifferent eyes from an imploring 
gaze, burned letters and photographs which it was his duty to keep, 
forgot someone's name or dropped certain widows, turned his back on 
prisoners under escort, and-but of course-always voted, rose to his 
feet and applauded obscenities ... how, otherwise, could he survive? 
How, moreover, could the great Archipelago have endured in our midst 
for fifty years unnoticed. (118) 
This passage helps explain why Solzhenitsyn believes that the introduction of 
political and civil liberties is not a sufficient basis for beginning the ascent out from 
under the rubble of communism. When people concentrate too much on the 
infringement of their rights, it draws them away from the painful imperative of 
repentance and makes them forget that "we, all of us, Russia herself were the 
necessary accomplices" (119) of Bolshevik tyranny. 
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National Bolshevism: 
The Ideological Defilement of Patriotism 
In the final section of part 3 of "Repentance and Self-Limitation in the Life of 
Nations" Solzhenitsyn turns to a dissection of National Bolshevism-a current of 
thought first articulated in the 1920s and increasingly influential in the Soviet 
Union from the late 1960s and 1970s onward. The proponents of National 
Bolshevism are uncritical patriots who believe that "tsarism and Bolshevism are 
equally irreproachable"; in their view, "the nation neither erred nor sinned either 
before 1917 or after" ( 119). They defend the purity and "Russianness" of the 
Petersburg and neo-Muscovite or Soviet periods ofRussian history alike, and scorn 
the penitential state of mind that, according to Solzhenitsyn, is integral to authentic 
Russian national consciousness. They deny any "nationality problem" within the 
U.S.S.R., freely celebrate Greater Russian and Soviet imperialism, and affirm what 
Solzhenitsyn elsewhere calls an unnatural "Commie-patriotic motley,"29 singing the 
praises of both October 1917 and the Orthodoxy that the revolution set out to 
expurgate. They share a narrowly racist or ethnic view of what it means to be 
Russian in contrast to Solzhenitsyn's own capacious emphasis on the spiritual, 
cultural, and political preconditions of Russian national identity. Solzhenitsyn 
explicitly rejects racialist definitions of Russian identity. In "The Russian 
Question" at the End of the Twentieth Century, he writes: "But when we say 
'nationality' we do not mean blood, but always a spirit, a consciousness, a person's 
orientation of preferences. "30 It is clear that Solzhenitsyn considers the temptation 
ofNational Bolshevism to be one of the fundamental obstacles to the recovery of 
a healthy national life rooted in repentance and self-limitation. 
Joseph Pearce has rightly noted that "Repentance and Self-Limitation" is a 
response to both liberal and neo-Marxist disparagements of Russian tradition and 
the National Bolshevik identification ofall things Russian and Soviet.31 In The Oak 
and the Calf Solzhenitsyn dedicates no fewer than twelve pages to the Chalmayev 
affair that engulfed the Soviet intellectual world in the late l 960s.32 Victor A. 
Chalmayev, an "obscure and mediocrejournalist,"33 had published two bombastic 
articles in Molodaya Gvardia that laid out the National Bolshevik worldview. 
Solzhenitsyn deplored the "illiteracy" of these articles, their hyperbolic disdain for 
all things Western, their "inordinate praise of the Russian character" and their 
incoherent exaltation of "the bloodstained Revolution as 'a joyous sacramental 
act. "'34 But he discerned in the midst of this hybrid of "Russianness" and 
"Redness"35 an effort, albeit incoherent, to come to terms with the spiritual poverty 
of contemporary Soviet society and to affirm the dignity of Russian national and 
spiritual traditions. Solzhenitsyn recounts his disappointment and anger that 
Aleksandr Tvardovsky's Novy Mir (the publisher of One Day in the Life of Ivan 
Denisovich) chose to run a "Marxist-Leninist" response to Chalmayev' s ramblings, 
one that heaped scorn on religion and traditional Russian patriotism and repeated 
the most shameless Soviet propaganda about the revolution and collectivization.36 
Solzhenitsyn had no sympathy for the National Bolshevik amalgam but felt equally 
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distant from the doctrinaire Marxism of Novy Mir's editors. Solzhenitsyn deftly 
locates their mistake through an adaptation of a proverb: 
Don't call in a wolf when dogs attack you. However viciously hostile 
the dogs, don't look to the Marxist wolf for help. Beat them with an 
honest stick, but don't call in the wolf. Because the wolf will end by 
gobbling up your liver.37 
The Chalmayev affair helped clarify Solzhenitsyn's opposition to both the 
dominant currents of Russian nationalism and the real and residual "leftism" of 
oppositional intellectuals in Brezhnev's U.S.S.R. "Repentance and Self-Limita-
tion" is Solzhenitsyn's "honest stick" for warding off the dog of National 
Bolshevism while avoiding the desiccated atheism and antitraditionalism of 
Russia's "westernizing" intellectuals. 
In a beautiful passage in the midst of his critique of National Bolshevism, 
Solzhenitsyn presents his own alternative understanding of patriotism properly 
understood: 
As we understand it patriotism means unqualified and unwavering love 
for the nation, which implies not uncritical eagerness to serve, not 
support for unjust claims, but frank assessment ofits vices and sins, and 
penitence for them. ( 120) 
This capital passage is crucial for understanding Solzhenitsyn's much maligned 
and misunderstood call for a renaissance of Russian national consciousness. Again 
and again, Solzhenitsyn has insisted that Russia's future lies in "recuperation" 
grounded in "repentance and self-limitation" (see 139-140). He told Jan Sapiets in 
an important 1979 BBC interview that Russia must "renounce all mad fantasies of 
foreign conquest and begin the peaceful, long, long, long period of recuperation. "38 
In his latest and perhaps final overtly political work, Russia in Collapse ( 1998), 
Solzhenitsyn continues his two-pronged assault on National Bolshevism and liberal 
antinational currents. In chapter 26 of that work, simply entitled "Patriotism," he 
admits that patriotism is capable of"deviations" and "perversions"39 like all other 
human sentiments. But he reminds his readers that the modem concept of liberty, 
too, is capable of great corruption. It is not for that reason rejected, even though its 
partisans tend to forget that "we are human beings only in the measure where we 
constantly feel in us, and above us, that which is our duty.'..w For Solzhenitsyn, 
then, patriotism is a necessary accompaniment and qualification of modem liberty. 
It takes us out of ourselves and reminds us of the givenness of our individual and 
collective existences. But Solzhenitsyn defends a dignified patriotism that is 
"charitable" and "creative": He rejects an "extremist patriotism ... which elevates 
nationality above all imaginable spiritual summits, above our humility faced with 
Heaven."41 Solzhenitsyn no more accepts the idolatry of blood or any form of 
particularity than he does the idolatry of class or revolution. He never forgets the 
unity of the human race (beautifully articulated in his "Nobel Lecture on 
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Literature"}42 nor God's judgment toward all excessive national self-assertion. He 
freely criticizes those ultranationalists who fulminate about the nefarious deeds of 
Masons and Jews, who applaud aggressive chauvinism, and who promote the 
deadly "union of nationalism and Bolshevism."43 In Russia in Collapse he bitterly 
exposes the fraudulence of the newly discovered patriotism ofRussia' s Communist 
party in a passage brimming with prophetic judgment: 
the current Communist party of the Russian Federation ... claims to be 
a popular and patriotic movement, and one favorable to orthodox 
religion! And not one of its current leaders will repent, nor even 
mention how many of these patriots and Orthodox they have drowned, 
shot, or reduced to ashes. What indecency, today, of putting between 
quotation marks ''the horrors of Bolshevism," ... No, these cosmic 
crimes will remain an indelible stain on communism.44 
Solzhenitsyn is Russia's most articulate defender of moderate and responsible 
patriotism and is a continuing scourge of aggressive, right-wing nationalism and 
of the enduring National Bolshevik temptation. His thirty-year effort to root 
patriotism in repentance and self-limitation is among the least understood and 
appreciated intellectual projects in the modem world, as evidenced by the 
widespread identification of Solzhenitsyn's political vision with tsarist imperialism, 
anti-Semitism, pan-Slavism, and even National Bolshevism itself (a ludicrous 
charge made by hack emigre scholars such as Alexander Y anov45). The root of this 
systemic misrepresentation of Solzhenitsyn's position is clear enough: 
contemporary intellectuals and journalists will tolerate no serious challenge to the 
enlightenment or progressivist assumptions underlying modem liberty, however 
moderate, restrained, or inspired by a love of human liberty this challenge might 
be. The political and philosophical alternatives are strictly binary: human beings 
must choose between an implicitly atheistic humanitarianism on the one hand and 
religious authoritarianism on the other. Liberal intellectuals will not seriously 
consider the possibility that "anthropocentric humanism," the rejection of the 
givenness of the human world, creates the preconditions for totalitarianism. In his 
recently translated 1939 essay, The Political Religions, the political philosopher 
Eric V oegelin brilliantly goes to the heart of the matter: 
There is no distinguished philosopher or thinker in the Western world 
today who, firstly, is not aware and has not also expressed this 
sentiment-that the world is experiencing a serious crisis, is undergoing 
a process of withering, which has its origins in the secularization of the 
soul and in the ensuing severance of a consequently purely secular soul 
from its roots in religiousness, and secondly, does not know that 
recovery can only be achieved through religious renewal, be it within 
the framework of the historical churches, be it outside this framework. 
It is precisely in this respect that the politicizing intellectuals fail 
completely. It is dreadful to hear time and time again that National 
Socialism is a return to barbarism, to the Dark Ages, to times before any 
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new progress toward humanitarianism was made, without these 
speakers suspecting that precisely the secularization of life that 
accompanied the doctrine of humanitarianism is the soil in which such 
an anti-Christian religious movement as National Socialism was able to 
prosper. For these secularized minds the religious question is a taboo, 
and they are suspicious of bringing it up seriously and radically.46 
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Solzhenitsyn belongs to the small camp of distinguished philosophers or thinkers 
who truly discern the nature of the modem spiritual crisis. He will continue to elicit 
the scorn of politicized intellectuals who can see in totalitarianism only an atavism 
of the unenlightened past that precedes the liberation of the human race from 
irrational restraints. 
Repentance vs. Self-Hatred 
Solzhenitsyn does not hesitate to defend the "transference" of repentance from the 
individual to the social and political realms. But we have already seen that the path 
ofrepentance is strewn with dangers-in part 3 of the essay Solzhenitsyn presented 
striking examples of repentance severed from political moderation and balanced 
historical judgment. In part 4 of"Repentance and Self-Limitation" Solzhenitsyn 
warns against efforts to repent that are tied to self-hatred and rejection of the 
Russian "national idea" itself. In part 3, Solzhenitsyn dissects the crude "National 
Bolshevik" adulation for all things Russian and Soviet, the synthesis and 
celebration of everything "Red" and "Russian"; in part 4 he takes on the liberal or 
pseudo liberal claim that "the Russian idea is the main content ofBolshevism"( 125) 
and the source of Russia's (and the world's) travails in the twentieth century. 
Solzhenitsyn addresses a series of articles on the theme of Russian national 
repentance that appeared in the emigre Russian Paris journal Vestnik RSKhD, 
(Herald of the Russian Student Christian Movement) no. 97. The authors of these 
articles called for nothing less than a thoroughgoing self-examination and self-
condemnation on the part of the Russian nation. Solzhenitsyn certainly has no 
principled objection to that call. But he is repulsed by the tone of these reflections 
-especially their lack of empathy for the fate of Russia. "There is not the slightest 
hint that the authors share any complicity with their countrymen . . . there is 
nothing but denunciation of the irredeemably vicious Russian people and a tone of 
contempt for those who have been led astray" (122). These articles, in 
Solzhenitsyn's view, aim not to rekindle a responsible and penitential Russian 
patriotism but to "bury" (122) Russia once and for all. Solzhenitsyn particularly 
objects to the claim that "more Evil has been brought into the world by Russia than 
any other country" (122) and to the accompanying assertion that "overcoming the 
national messianic delusion is Russia's most urgent task" ( 124 ). The liberal critics 
of the Russian national idea show an unacknowledged complicity with their 
National Bolshevik enemies: both refuse to distinguish Russia's imperfect 
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precommunist past from the unprecedented crimes committed in the name of an 
anti-Christian, antinational, and antiliberal ideology. 
Solzhenitsyn states explicitly that his article "has not been written to minimize 
the guilt of the Russian people" (127). But neither will he tolerate the heaping of 
scorn on a people who have been the first and principal victim of the Bolshevik 
plague. He adamantly rejects the idea that totalitarianism is somehow Russian in 
its essence or that ''the idea of the Third Rome suddenly surfaces again in the guise 
of the Third International" (124). Russia and the Russian national idea are not 
responsible for the protototalitarianism of the French Revolution, for the evils of 
the Third Reich, or for the coercive propensities of Marxism itself, an eminently 
Western current of thought. Solzhenitsyn particularly objects to the claim that ''the 
class hatred" and atheism integral to communist ideology are somehow secretly 
indebted to Orthodoxy, the "faith by which Russia lived so long." The "main 
content" of Bolshevism is the decidedly un-Russian ideas of"unbridled militant 
atheism and class struggle" ( 125). These ideas have intellectual origins and 
political antecedents outside of Russia (European millenarian movements of the 
late Middle Ages and the Reformation, Jacobinism, and Marxism itself) and cannot 
reasonably be blamed on an inherently messianic "Russian idea." Proletarian 
messianism was first and foremost an ideological movement that took on a 
blatantly Russophobic character, assaulting the Church and destroying the "flowers 
of the Russian people" (125), the gentry, clergy, intelligentsia, and peasantry. 
Undoubtedly as time went on, efforts were made by the authorities to co-opt 
Russian patriotism by promoting its self-destruction. "Once it was victorious on 
Russian soil the movement was bound to draw Russian forces in its wake and 
acquire Russian features" (126). But Solzhenitsyn rightly insists that communism 
in the U.S.S.R. remained an essentially antinational ideology. It had, especially in 
the first decades of Soviet rule, "some of the characteristics of a foreign invasion" 
(126). Communism had the same ideological profile wherever it was applied: a 
single-party dictatorship, militant atheism, the forcible imposition of a pseudo-
scientific ideology as the key to understanding every aspect oflife, and an abusive 
and ''wooden" rhetoric that demonized real or imagined enemies. Can the 
indulgence of intellectuals for Marxism throughout most of this century, 
Solzhenitsyn asks, be blamed on the Russian national idea (127)? Is communist 
totalitarianism in Cuba or Asia "an organic outgrowth of Russian life," to quote the 
authors in Vestnik (127)? Does the totalitarian nightmare derive "from the 
unwashed monk Filofei" (128), that is, from the obscure medieval author of the 
theory of Moscow being the "Third Rome"? To ask these questions is effectively 
to answer them. 
Solzhenitsyn's attack on the false repentance promoted by liberal, antinational 
intellectuals is not intended to whitewash the Russian past. Solzhenitsyn has gone 
as far as reasonably possible in advocating a thorough reconsideration and 
reevaluation of the unsavory dimensions of the Russian and particularly the Soviet 
past. But, in his view, this process must be guided by a deep and abiding love of 
Russia if it is not to degenerate into nihilistic self-hatred or to lose a sense of 
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historical and political proportion. He freely admits that Russians "were not 
vaccinated against the plague" and "lost [their] heads" (127). Russians must 
forthrightly confront their past while maintaining their self-respect. Crucial to that 
task is maintaining a firm separation of things Russian and Soviet, a distinction 
collapsed by both liberals and National Bolsheviks. 
Solzhenitsyn concludes part 4 by reiterating that the path of repentance "will 
bristle with ... insults and slanders." Partisans of genuine repentance "must expect 
predators in the guise of penitents to flock around and peck your liver." Still he 
insists "there is no way out, except that of repentance" (quotations drawn from 
128). Solzhenitsyn limns a principled middle path between the cultured despisers 
of patriotism, the advocates of repentance without patriotism, and the fevered 
advocates of National Bolshevism, nationalists who disdain both self-knowledge 
and all penitential impulses. Solzhenitsyn's is a lonely path but one that resonates 
with that section of the Russian public that yearns for a Russian national rebirth 
shorn of nostalgia for despotism or for irresponsible dreams of foreign conquest 
and imperial domination. 
Repentance and Self-Limitation: The Path oflnner Development 
In the fifth and final section of "Repentance and Self-Limitation" Solzhenitsyn 
finally turns to an analysis of "self-limitation." In the process, he clarifies the 
relationship between these two principles. It might be said that while repentance 
is absolutely indispensable for "a clearing of the ground, the establishment of a 
clean basis in preparation for further moral actions" (135), self-limitation is the 
"crown" of the moral virtues for Solzhenitsyn. 
Repentance for internal and external sins (128) is self-limitation's necessary but 
"always difficult" precondition. "And not only because we must cross the threshold 
of self-love, but also because our sins are not so easily visible to us" (129). A 
detailed analysis of Russo-Polish relations over five centuries (129-33) reveals a 
"tangle of crimes" ( 129), which can only be overcome by "mutual repentance" and 
"magnanimity"(133) on both sides. Solzhenitsyn freely admits Russia's unsavory 
role in the partitions of Poland as well as the terrible Soviet crimes against Poland, 
which cry out for repentance. These include the "stab in the back for dying Poland" 
on September 17, 1939, the Katyn forest massacre, and the "heartless immobility 
on the banks of the Vistula in August 1944" (130) when Soviet troops stood idly 
by as Hitler crushed the nationalist uprising in Warsaw. But Solzhenitsyn makes 
clear that even prostrate Poland is not without historic blame. Writing as a spirited 
Russian as well as a penitential one, Solzhenitsyn discusses the imperialism of 
Poland in the prime of its power (an imperialism freely accepted by educated 
society). He also painfully recalls Poland's assault against Russia in 1920, an 
assault aimed not at undermining Bolshevism or helping the Whites in the Civil 
War but at plundering and carving up Russian territory during her time of crisis. 
Solzhenitsyn also laments the "relentless Polonization" carried out in Poland during 
132 Daniel J. Mahoney 
the interwarperiod (132-33). In Solzhenitsyn's view, only repentance can provide 
a way out of this morass, allowing Poles and Russians to overcome historic 
animosities and begin a "new relationship" rooted in "mutual forgiveness" and self-
restraint (133). 
Solzhenitsyn appeals to the natural gift of repentance, a virtue with clear 
Christian resonances and antecedents. But he explicitly ties repentance to 
magnanimity or greatness of soul, suggesting that a great and self-respecting people 
ought to welcome the path of mutual repentance and forgiveness among nations. 
This natural coexistence and mutual reinforcement of humility and magnanimity 
is at the heart of Solzhenitsyn's reflection.47 (It might even be said to describe the 
man himself, a spirited Christian who combines immense personal courage and 
authoritative moral witness with measured patriotism and a profound sense of 
natural and divine limits.) The humble acceptance ofa nation's responsibility for 
its internal and external sins is powerfully reinforced by a sense of national honor 
that allows a people to take responsibility for their collective life. 
The dialectic of humility and magnanimity is further reflected in the fact that the 
Christian virtue ofrepentance is completed and deepened by a classical appeal to 
moderation in personal and political life. But Solzhenitsyn also understands the 
"moral revolution," the "turn toward inner development" (137) made possible by 
self-limitation, in explicitly Christian terms. Just as repentance depends on 
magnanimous self-regard to gain a foothold in the human world, so self-limitation 
or moderation needs to be "for the sake of others" ( 136). Solzhenitsyn juxtaposes 
"the true Christian definition of freedom"-"self-restriction"-with the "Western 
ideal of unlimited freedom" and "the Marxist concept of freedom as acceptance of 
the yoke ofnecessity" (136). 
Rejecting "the concept of infinite progress" (137) dear to both Western 
liberalism and Marxist historicism, Solzhenitsyn recommends a "tum toward inner 
development" (137) marked by "prudent self-restriction" (138). He has the good 
sense to appreciate the revolutionary character of this recommendation. The 
rejection of the modem faith in progress would "be a great turning point in the 
history of mankind, comparable to the transition from the Middle Ages to the 
Renaissance" (137). This moral revolution will require "both courage and 
sacrifice" although it must eschew every element of "cruelty" ( 13 7). Solzhenitsyn 
is not a partisan of bourgeois liberalism but rejects every totalitarian effort to 
overcome it through specious appeals to History or collective self-assertion. His 
attack on the politics of cruelty firmly distinguishes his thought from the atheism 
of the Nietzschean or post-Christian Right. 
Solzhenitsyn accepts the essential elements of a free society, noting that "the 
fundamental concepts of private property and private economic initiative are part 
of man's nature, and necessary for his personal freedom and his sense of normal 
well-being" ( 138). But he also laments that "no incentive to self-limitation has ever 
existed in bourgeois economics, yet the formula would so easily and so long ago 
have been derived from moral considerations." Solzhenitsyn is undoubtedly right 
that prudent self-restriction uneasily coexists with the "pursuit of wealth, fame, and 
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change" integral to bourgeois or commercial society. But private property and 
economic initiatives depend on what Bertrand de Jouvenel has called "the essential 
freedom . . . the freedom to create a gathering, to generate a group, and thereby 
introduce in society a new power, a source of movement and change.'>48 The stable 
economy of the kind endorsed by Solzhenitsyn, developed only through 
"improved technology," could be sustained only by serious limitations on 
individual initiative. As I have suggested elsewhere, self-limitation can provide, at 
best, a salutary corrective to the relentless dynamism of the modem society and 
economy. But ifhuman beings are free to initiate, a commercial economy will be 
by definition anything but stable. As Jouvenel suggests, the task of statesmanship 
in the modem context is not to undermine the essential freedom to initiate, but to 
sustain institutions and attitudes that counterbalance the disruption inherent in a 
"progressive" society. 
More recently, Solzhenitsyn seems to have confronted this basic conundrum. In 
the Liechtenstein Address, he writes that "human knowledge and human abilities 
continue to be perfected; they cannot, and must not, be brought to a halt." The 
fundamental task is not to confuse technical with moral progress: Solzhenitsyn 
rightly asserts, against all forms of progressivism, that ''there can be only one true 
Progress; the sum total of the spiritual progresses ofindividuals; the degree ofself-
perfection in their lives.'>49 There is some evidence for thinking that Solzhenitsyn 
has come to moderate his expectation that self-limitation could become the 
animating principle of a transformed political order. In 1998 he commented to his 
biographer, Joseph Pearce, that "the idea of self-limitation is not successful if you 
try to propagandize it. Mostly, I think, only highly religious people are willing to 
accept the idea. For instance, if you try to propagandize the idea of self-limitation 
to governments or states and say that they should learn not to grab what belongs 
to others, this does not have an effect."50 Solzhenitsyn has, of course, in no way 
abandoned his recommendation of repentance, self-limitation, and inner 
development as the path for renewal in Russia and the West. He has never stopped 
insisting that "self-limitation is the fundamental and wisest step of a man who has 
obtained his freedom.''51 But Solzhenitsyn has fewer expectations for fundamental 
moral reform, especially at the political level. Perhaps because of a mellowing that 
accompanies age, perhaps in response to Russia's present discontents, Solzhenitsyn 
has a fuller sense of the limits of politics than he articulated in the 1974 essay. That 
said, there has been no fundamental change in his support for the "transference" of 
repentance and self-limitation to the political and social spheres. Today, however, 
Solzhenitsyn seems more prudent and patient-and less confident that an ascent 
from modernity is an immediate or likely political possibility. 
Self-Limitation: The Key to Russia's Future 
Solzhenitsyn suggf;Sts near the end ofhis essay that Russia "perhaps more than any 
other country [is] =.n need of comprehensive inward development" ( 139). Rejecting 
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all imperial conceits, whether put forward in the name of Pan-Slavism52 or Marxist 
"Theory" ( 139), Solzhenitsyn argues that Russia must "concentrate on its inner 
tasks, on healing its soul, educating its children, putting its own house in order" 
( 140). The healing of souls is all the more necessary given the "long complicity" 
of the Russian people in "lies and even crimes" (130). Russia's first and most 
arduous task is freeing herself from the tutelage of the ideological lie-and 
education is indispensable to this task. 
Solzhenitsyn suggests that "the school ... is the key to the future of Russia" 
( 140), a theme that he reiterated in greater detail in his 1990 essay Rebuilding 
Russia. There he noted the lamentable character of Russia's schools outside "select 
institutions of larger cities," the reduction of the living standards of teachers to 
subsistence levels, the need to replace ideologically driven textbooks and to 
eliminate atheistic indoctrination. He also gave his qualified endorsement to the 
establishment of tuition-charging private institutions as long as they do not 
"institute irresponsibly arbitrary curricula."53 As Delba Winthrop has observed, 
Solzhenitsyn prudently emphasizes education (and not the Church) as the crucial 
factor in determining Russia's future. 54 He recognizes that the deplorable character 
of Russia's educational system "cannot be solved in one generation" and ''will 
require immense efforts" and resources made available by the jettisoning of 
"vainglorious and unnecessary foreign expenditure" (140). Part of Solzhenitsyn's 
deep aversion to the "oligarchy" that rules the new Russia lies in his conviction that 
they have squandered an opportunity to redress the human devastation inherited 
from communism. Not only have they failed to repent but they have also neglected 
education, failed to pay teachers and other civil servants, and continued to ignore 
the provinces and villages. Above all, they have been bereft of a sense of public 
responsibility for the rebuilding of Russia. 
Solzhenitsyn also believes that Russia will need a project to occupy her "national 
and political zeal" (141) once she has turned away from the paths of imperial and 
ideological self-aggrandizement. He reiterates the call for the full development of 
the Russian Northeast-including parts of the north of European Russia and all of 
Siberia north of the railway line-that he developed in greater detail in his Letter 
to the Soviet Leaders. 55 In that work, he cited Stolypin's "prophetic" words to the 
State Duma in 1908: ''The land is a guarantee of our strength in the future, the land 
is Russia. "56 The cultivation of a Northeast "left stagnant and icily barren for four 
centuries" (141) will demand patriotic devotion and sacrifices as well as the 
prudent use of modem technology. A Northeast brought to life will certainly entail 
the definitive rejection of the camp society of the past, ofa Northeast coextensive 
with Gulag. It will also be a palpable sign "that Russia has resolutely opted for self-
/imitation, for turning inward rather than outward" ( 142). In addition, its great 
expanses "offer (Russians) a way out of the worldwide technological crisis" (142) 
chronicled by the likes of the Club of Rome (143 ). If Solzhenitsyn too readily 
accepts the Malthusian calculations of ecologists, he nonetheless recognizes that 
the prudent use of technology is an essential ingredient in addressing the ecological 
challenges that confront modem societies. 
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Characteristically, Solzhenitsyn ends on a note of qualified hope. The future need 
not be catastrophic if modem societies rethink their commitment to infinite 
progress (137) and rekindle a sense of prudent self-restriction. 
Conclusion 
"Repentance and Self-Limitation" is Solzhenitsyn's clearest and most com-
prehensive articulation ofhis constructive response to the crisis of modernity. It is 
also one of his crucial statements about the path he envisions for a postcommunist 
Russia that builds on its precommunist traditions while rejecting the imperial 
delusion common (to radically different degrees) to the Petersburg and neo-
Muscovite periods of Russian history. Its call for repentance and self-limitation 
gives concrete expression to Solzhenitsyn's claim in the Harvard Address that there 
is no place to go but "upward" from modernity, in a great anthropological ascent 
comparable to the movement from the Middle Ages to the Modem Era. 57 
We have seen that some of Solzhenitsyn's empirical claims are questionable; 
that he sometimes comes close to collapsing the crucial distinction between moral 
and political judgment; and that his often penetrating analysis of the modem crisis 
tends to be meandering and impressionistic in character. But the 1974 essay reveals 
a deep philosophical attentiveness to the moral resources without which individual 
and collective life are deeply impoverished. It also clarifies Solzhenitsyn's relations 
to the great traditions ofreason and revelation, ofhumility and magnanimity, which 
form the W estem soul in the broadest sense of the term. And nothing in our 
experience, not even the West's victory in the Cold War, has disproved 
Solzhenitsyn's provocative claim that "a society with unlimited rights is incapable 
of standing up to adversity."58 Solzhenitsyn joins a distinguished tradition of 
Western thought, from Aristotle to Burke and beyond, that rejects the idea that 
consent can be the sole foundation ofa properly human order.59 He does not reject 
human rights so much as place them within their proper ontological and political 
context: "if we do not wish to be ruled by a coercive authority, then each must 
reign himselfin .... Human freedom ... includes voluntary self-limitation for the 
sake of others. "60 The systematic misrepresentation of Solzhenitsyn's position over 
the years reveals how little our contemporaries are prepared to accept the insight 
that "human rights" can never be what Burke once said of prudence, "the god of 
this world below." 
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